Editing 1724: Proofs

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The way that Ms Lenhart's proof refers to the act of doing math itself, is characteristic of metamathematical proofs, for example {{w|Gödel's incompleteness theorems}}, which, at first sight, may indeed look like black magic, even if in the end they must be a "perfectly sensible chain of reasoning" like the rest of good mathematics. While typical mathematical theorems and their proofs deal with such mathematical objects as numbers, functions, points or lines, the metamathematical theorems treat other theorems as objects of interest. In this way you can propose and prove theorems about possibility of proving other theorems. For example, in 1931 {{w|Kurt Gödel}} was able to prove that any mathematical system based on arithmetics (that is using numbers) has statements that are true, but can be neither proved nor disproved. This kind of metamathematical reasoning is especially useful in {{w|set theory}}, where many statements become impossible to prove or disprove if the {{w|axiom of choice}} is not taken as a part of the axiomatic system.
 
The way that Ms Lenhart's proof refers to the act of doing math itself, is characteristic of metamathematical proofs, for example {{w|Gödel's incompleteness theorems}}, which, at first sight, may indeed look like black magic, even if in the end they must be a "perfectly sensible chain of reasoning" like the rest of good mathematics. While typical mathematical theorems and their proofs deal with such mathematical objects as numbers, functions, points or lines, the metamathematical theorems treat other theorems as objects of interest. In this way you can propose and prove theorems about possibility of proving other theorems. For example, in 1931 {{w|Kurt Gödel}} was able to prove that any mathematical system based on arithmetics (that is using numbers) has statements that are true, but can be neither proved nor disproved. This kind of metamathematical reasoning is especially useful in {{w|set theory}}, where many statements become impossible to prove or disprove if the {{w|axiom of choice}} is not taken as a part of the axiomatic system.
  
Using a position on the blackboard as a part of the proof is a joke, but it bears a resemblance to {{w|Cantor's diagonal argument}} where a position in a sequence of digits of a real number was a tool in a proof that not all infinite sets have the same {{w|cardinality}} (rough equivalent of the number of elements). This "diagonal method" is also often used in metamathematical proofs.
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Using a position on the blackboard as a part of the proof is a joke, but it bears a resemblance to the {{w|Cantor's diagonal argument}} where a position in a sequence of digits of a real number was a tool in a proof that not all infinite sets have the same {{w|cardinality}} (rough equivalent of the number of elements). This "diagonal method" is also often used in metamathematical proofs.
  
 
The axiom of choice itself states that for every collection of disjoint nonempty sets, you can have a function that draws one element from each set of the collection. This axiom, once considered controversial, was added relatively late to the axiomatic set theory, and even contemporary mathematicians still study which theorems really require its inclusion. In the title text the decision of whether to take the axiom of choice is made by a deterministic process, that is a process which future states can be developed with no randomness involved. {{w|Determinacy}} of infinite games is used as a tool in the set theory, however the deterministic process is rather a term of the {{w|stochastic process|stochastic processes theory}}, and the {{w|dynamical systems theory}}, branches of mathematics far from the abstract set theory, which makes the proof even more exotic. The axiom of choice was mentioned earlier in [[804: Pumpkin Carving]] and later in [[982: Set Theory]], another comic about a math class with a similar theme on how teachers teach their student mathematical proofs.
 
The axiom of choice itself states that for every collection of disjoint nonempty sets, you can have a function that draws one element from each set of the collection. This axiom, once considered controversial, was added relatively late to the axiomatic set theory, and even contemporary mathematicians still study which theorems really require its inclusion. In the title text the decision of whether to take the axiom of choice is made by a deterministic process, that is a process which future states can be developed with no randomness involved. {{w|Determinacy}} of infinite games is used as a tool in the set theory, however the deterministic process is rather a term of the {{w|stochastic process|stochastic processes theory}}, and the {{w|dynamical systems theory}}, branches of mathematics far from the abstract set theory, which makes the proof even more exotic. The axiom of choice was mentioned earlier in [[804: Pumpkin Carving]] and later in [[982: Set Theory]], another comic about a math class with a similar theme on how teachers teach their student mathematical proofs.

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