Editing 182: Nash
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==Explanation== | ==Explanation== | ||
β | The first panel references a scene in the movie {{w|A Beautiful Mind (film)|A Beautiful Mind}} in which {{w|John Forbes Nash, Jr.|Dr. John Forbes Nash, Jr.}} comes up with his famous concept of {{w|Nash equilibrium}} when he realizes that they get suboptimal results if all the guys go after the same hot girl. The second panel deconstructs the idea | + | The first panel references a scene in the movie {{w|A Beautiful Mind (film)|A Beautiful Mind}} in which {{w|John Forbes Nash, Jr.|Dr. John Forbes Nash, Jr.}} comes up with his famous concept of {{w|Nash equilibrium}} when he realizes that they get suboptimal results if all the guys go after the same hot girl. The second panel deconstructs the idea by having Dr. Nash point out that staying away from the hot girl does not actually constitute a stable Nash equilibrium. The third panel has physicist {{w|Richard Feynman|Dr. Richard Feynman}} render their entire discussion a moot point by taking all the girls while the mathematicians ponder optimal strategies. |
In fact, the situation in the comic is a great example of what a Nash equilibrium is ''not''. The only reason that one player (pun intended) wouldn't try to go for the hot girl is if they were afraid that someone else would go for the hot girl as well. However, in a Nash equilibrium, each player assumes that the other players won't change their strategy, and concludes from this assumption that their own strategy shouldn't change either. If all of them have the strategy of flirting with the hot girl's friends, and all of them are assuming (incorrectly) that the others won't change their strategies, then they all would change their strategies simultaneously, breaking the equilibrium. | In fact, the situation in the comic is a great example of what a Nash equilibrium is ''not''. The only reason that one player (pun intended) wouldn't try to go for the hot girl is if they were afraid that someone else would go for the hot girl as well. However, in a Nash equilibrium, each player assumes that the other players won't change their strategy, and concludes from this assumption that their own strategy shouldn't change either. If all of them have the strategy of flirting with the hot girl's friends, and all of them are assuming (incorrectly) that the others won't change their strategies, then they all would change their strategies simultaneously, breaking the equilibrium. |