Editing 463: Voting Machines
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==Explanation== | ==Explanation== | ||
− | In the 2008 Ohio primary elections, there were numerous problems with electronic voting machines, which eventually required many districts to revert to pen and paper. Premier Election Solutions, the company that handled the machines, [http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/08/ohio-voting-machines-contained.html blamed these problems] on {{w|McAfee}} antivirus software. | + | In the 2008 Ohio primary elections, there were numerous problems with electronic voting machines, which eventually required many districts to revert to pen and paper. Premier Election Solutions, the company that handled the machines, [http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/08/ohio-voting-machines-contained.html blamed these problems] on {{w|McAfee}} antivirus software. |
It is not uncommon to see computer software contracts stipulating that the vendor will warrant that software and systems delivered will not contain any viruses or malicious code ("malware") — a knee-jerk reaction to this is for novice management to include malware-scanning "antivirus" software for systems that otherwise are closed. From a computer programming standpoint, having antivirus software on an electronic voting machine doesn't make sense, because ideally the machine shouldn't be connecting to *anything* external (eg the internet, USB, a local network, removable drives, bluetooth...) that would leave it open to malware attacks. While there are many ways that malware can reach a computer, ultimately the computer still has to run executable code that was not distributed with it in the first place, which is something that ''no election machine should encounter'' in normal operation. Hence, the question is whether the voting machine manufacturer has taken the proper precaution preventing any external access. | It is not uncommon to see computer software contracts stipulating that the vendor will warrant that software and systems delivered will not contain any viruses or malicious code ("malware") — a knee-jerk reaction to this is for novice management to include malware-scanning "antivirus" software for systems that otherwise are closed. From a computer programming standpoint, having antivirus software on an electronic voting machine doesn't make sense, because ideally the machine shouldn't be connecting to *anything* external (eg the internet, USB, a local network, removable drives, bluetooth...) that would leave it open to malware attacks. While there are many ways that malware can reach a computer, ultimately the computer still has to run executable code that was not distributed with it in the first place, which is something that ''no election machine should encounter'' in normal operation. Hence, the question is whether the voting machine manufacturer has taken the proper precaution preventing any external access. |