Difference between revisions of "Talk:1844: Voting Systems"

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One thing I don't get: Why Condorcet can't be used on 3 or more candidates. I read a bit of the Wikipedia link about the Condorcet Paradox, okay, I see the POTENTIAL paradox, but it's not necessarily so. Sure it MAY be that 3 candidates get equal support in this way, but numerically this is so horribly unlikely I'm suprised it's not only being considered, but given such significant weight as to say it can't be used! As I understand it, using last year's election, it works like this: Trump, Hillary, and let's throw in Bernie Sanders as the third. As I'm understanding the explanation of the Condorcet Method, if a hypothetical election between Bernie and Trump would have Bernie winning (based on support? Sounds like no actual voting taking place), and a hypothetical election between Bernie and Hillary would also have Bernie winning, then Bernie is the winner. But that's 3 people, what doesn't work? And if Condorcet only works with 2 candidates, how is that not just a normal vote? The Paradox seems to say if exactly a third of voters rank Bernie over Hillary over Trump, one third says Hillary over Trump over Bernie, and the final third has Trump over Hillary over Bernie, then THAT'S the Condorcet Paradox. But that's SO specific, it's unlikely! - NiceGuy1 [[Special:Contributions/108.162.219.64|108.162.219.64]] 03:36, 2 June 2017 (UTC) I agree. Who cares about the Condorcet winner when there is the Smith set? [[User:Barrackar|Barrackar]] ([[User talk:Barrackar|talk]]) 07:35, 2 June 2017 (UTC)
 
One thing I don't get: Why Condorcet can't be used on 3 or more candidates. I read a bit of the Wikipedia link about the Condorcet Paradox, okay, I see the POTENTIAL paradox, but it's not necessarily so. Sure it MAY be that 3 candidates get equal support in this way, but numerically this is so horribly unlikely I'm suprised it's not only being considered, but given such significant weight as to say it can't be used! As I understand it, using last year's election, it works like this: Trump, Hillary, and let's throw in Bernie Sanders as the third. As I'm understanding the explanation of the Condorcet Method, if a hypothetical election between Bernie and Trump would have Bernie winning (based on support? Sounds like no actual voting taking place), and a hypothetical election between Bernie and Hillary would also have Bernie winning, then Bernie is the winner. But that's 3 people, what doesn't work? And if Condorcet only works with 2 candidates, how is that not just a normal vote? The Paradox seems to say if exactly a third of voters rank Bernie over Hillary over Trump, one third says Hillary over Trump over Bernie, and the final third has Trump over Hillary over Bernie, then THAT'S the Condorcet Paradox. But that's SO specific, it's unlikely! - NiceGuy1 [[Special:Contributions/108.162.219.64|108.162.219.64]] 03:36, 2 June 2017 (UTC) I agree. Who cares about the Condorcet winner when there is the Smith set? [[User:Barrackar|Barrackar]] ([[User talk:Barrackar|talk]]) 07:35, 2 June 2017 (UTC)
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''To the Canadian commenter:'' have you followed the elections of the Conservative party? It looks to me like a recent large-scale use of an "non-traditional" voting system. I've heard it criticised for its complexity, but no discussion on why it was chosen.
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[http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/how-the-2017-conservative-leadership-vote-will-work/ Description here]
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[[Special:Contributions/162.158.126.88|162.158.126.88]] 15:31, 2 June 2017 (UTC) anothercanadiancommenter

Revision as of 15:31, 2 June 2017

Looks like 2 of us added explanations at the same time. Someone else want to consolidate them and produce a concise explanation? ~blackhat 162.158.69.75 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)

I tried merging our explanations, so there is a small improvement, but there is still some duplicated information. Plus I'm not a native english speaker, so a consolidation by a third editor would be welcome. 141.101.69.165 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)

Something I don't understand about the Arrow Impossibility Theorem: In the example given, the result of the election is obviously a 3-way tie, where each candidate got exactly equal support. Surely the Arrow Impossibility Theorem doesn't complain about voting system's inability to intuitively break an exact tie? 172.68.34.58 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)

I think there is another layer of explanation here. When Cueball is discussing this - he's talking about voting for which voting system is to be chosen. The choice is Approval versus Instant Runoff - but isn't Cueball arguing about using a Condorcet method to decide WHICH voting method to choose? This is emphasised by the mouse-over text which talks about him dynamically changing his choice of ultimate candidate based on the election system chosen - which is exactly the Condorset paradox, but when applied to the selection of which voting system you want rather than the choice of candidate. Again reinforced by the discussion of "Strong Arrows theorem" which at that same meta-voting level. 162.158.69.39 15:40, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
The "exact tie" only exists because ranked-choice ballots destroy any information about strength of preference. It likely wouldn't be an exact tie with a Score voting ballot, for instance. 162.158.62.51 00:02, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

Generally the idea behind Arrow's Theorem is that you would get different results if you did a vote where the choices were just A or B, B or C, C or A, thus no option wins head to head against the others (Condorset Paradox). An example I recently read was economic policy, and how the options being presented can cause policy to fluctuate wildly in a democracy as the outcome depends on the options compared. -- 108.162.249.10 16:01, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Neither Arrow's Theorem nor the joke makes any reference to Condorcet's paradox. Rather, the joke is that it shows an individual voter who apparently fails to satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives. This is one of the criteria in Arrow's theorem, and it is normally always regarded as being true of any individual's opinions, just not necessarily of the outcome of an election. Zmatt (talk) 18:38, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
For reference: both instant run-off voting (IRV) and every concorcet method fail independence of irrelevant alternatives. Some (most?) condorcet systems satisfy all other criteria of Arrow's theorem, while IRV also fails monotonicity. Approval voting satisfies both, but it is outside the scope of Arrow's theorem as it is not a ranked voting system. Zmatt (talk) 18:47, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

"Arrow's impossibility theorem states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking." Arrow's theorem does not say that. Arrow's impossibility theorem says "When voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking that is complete, transitive, Pareto efficient, have universal domain, has no dictator, and independent of irrelevant alternatives." The conditions matter, and the non-dictatorship condition in particular is horrible misnamed.

"The theorem may be interpreted in a way suggesting that no matter what voting electoral system is implemented in a democracy, the resulting democratic choices are equally imperfect". No. Perfection is an absolute so things are either perfect or they are not. "Equally imperfect" is a tautology. If you are going to throw in "equally" some voting methods are manifestly closer to perfection than others, some voting methods satisfy all but one of Arrow's conditions, while others satisfy none of them.

162.158.62.21 18:05, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Arrow's Theorem is based on a fundamentally flawed approach in the first place, which he realized later in life. Using ordered rankings to estimate utility is not a very good plan. Voting systems based around estimating utility directly (rated rather than ranked) are much better. It was based on economist dogma that utility can't be compared meaningfully between individuals, but interpersonal comparisons of preference are even less valid. 162.158.62.51 00:02, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

Totally unrelated to the discussion, but interesting that Cueball has moved from being between a black hat and a black haired women in 1842: Anti-Drone Eagles to being between a White Hat and a white haired woman, two comics later, where he starts speaking in both comics. :-) --Kynde (talk) 18:09, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

For deep (but simply explained) insight into voting systems, (and why the American first past the pole system sucks), see this playlist of youtube videos by CGP Grey --Kynde (talk) 18:16, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Unfortunately he repeats incorrect statements like "IRV eliminates the spoiler effect" and obviously hasn't done honest research on it. 162.158.62.51 00:02, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

GOOMHR!

Cueball almost perfectly matches my views on voting. I think Approval is far and away the best (due to ease of implementation and low chance of paradox). Condorcet & IRV use the same ballot design, but IRV is mathematically inferior, so I don't get why anyone likes it, other than bandwagon effects. The only situation where I'd support IRV is if it were the only viable option to replace FPTP, which is unfortunately the case in many places. - Frankie (talk) 22:45, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Frankie, the two established parties Democrats and Republicans both favor IRV over Condorcet precisely because of its mathematical biases. The 'deficiencies' of IRV tend to eliminate centrist moderates early in the process and leave the established parties in political power. IRV represents a slower change to the political status quo. Barrackar (talk) 07:35, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

The larger the democracy, the less a single vote matters, regardless of the voting system. I, for one, support a return to the system of democratic city-states with annual elections. If a sizeable focal minority don't agree with their government, they can just break off and declare their area a separate city-state. Of course, this could eventually create a loose alliance of house-states or even people-states each with their individual laws and foreign policy. --Nialpxe, 2017. (Arguments welcome) 02:44, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

I think this might be the first xkcd, in over 1,800 comics, that I understood literally nothing on my own. Wow. Except that this was something about voting, caught the word voting, LOL! I usually get at least a few things, and come here to fill in any gaps. Guess discussing these 4 things is particularly American, I've never heard of any of them (as a Canadian, and on an iPad where I can only see the title text here).

One thing I don't get: Why Condorcet can't be used on 3 or more candidates. I read a bit of the Wikipedia link about the Condorcet Paradox, okay, I see the POTENTIAL paradox, but it's not necessarily so. Sure it MAY be that 3 candidates get equal support in this way, but numerically this is so horribly unlikely I'm suprised it's not only being considered, but given such significant weight as to say it can't be used! As I understand it, using last year's election, it works like this: Trump, Hillary, and let's throw in Bernie Sanders as the third. As I'm understanding the explanation of the Condorcet Method, if a hypothetical election between Bernie and Trump would have Bernie winning (based on support? Sounds like no actual voting taking place), and a hypothetical election between Bernie and Hillary would also have Bernie winning, then Bernie is the winner. But that's 3 people, what doesn't work? And if Condorcet only works with 2 candidates, how is that not just a normal vote? The Paradox seems to say if exactly a third of voters rank Bernie over Hillary over Trump, one third says Hillary over Trump over Bernie, and the final third has Trump over Hillary over Bernie, then THAT'S the Condorcet Paradox. But that's SO specific, it's unlikely! - NiceGuy1 108.162.219.64 03:36, 2 June 2017 (UTC) I agree. Who cares about the Condorcet winner when there is the Smith set? Barrackar (talk) 07:35, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

To the Canadian commenter: have you followed the elections of the Conservative party? It looks to me like a recent large-scale use of an "non-traditional" voting system. I've heard it criticised for its complexity, but no discussion on why it was chosen. Description here 162.158.126.88 15:31, 2 June 2017 (UTC) anothercanadiancommenter