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| | In the most common private-messaging scenarios, casual surveillance at the network infrastructure level is the only surveillance that people are actually worried about ''when deciding what protocol to use for communication''. 1) Any security at the device level can't be a concern of the choice of messaging service - if you've got a keylogger, it's going to log your keys in all messaging services, encrypted or not. 2) If you've got highly motivated and resource-rich individuals or hostile foreign governments trying to tail you specifically, you're presumably doing something that would necessitate learning about more secure communication methods in the first place. [[Special:Contributions/108.162.241.14|108.162.241.14]] 05:13, 2 October 2020 (UTC) | | In the most common private-messaging scenarios, casual surveillance at the network infrastructure level is the only surveillance that people are actually worried about ''when deciding what protocol to use for communication''. 1) Any security at the device level can't be a concern of the choice of messaging service - if you've got a keylogger, it's going to log your keys in all messaging services, encrypted or not. 2) If you've got highly motivated and resource-rich individuals or hostile foreign governments trying to tail you specifically, you're presumably doing something that would necessitate learning about more secure communication methods in the first place. [[Special:Contributions/108.162.241.14|108.162.241.14]] 05:13, 2 October 2020 (UTC) |
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| − | :A first-step for deliberate surveillance might even be "is traffic of this service type leaving from/arriving at this device", even with an utter sparcity of internal meta-data access due to all that being securely packaged within various E2E/E2S2E encyption envelopes and layering. Corresponding/coincident traffic at the other end of a (synchronous/live) rerouting of that data with similar cursory monitoring, regardless of how much serving/proxying happens between them, can actually link the end-users. Both originally having been 'of interest', but the known link can be enough to raise 'interest' to 'suspicion' even without necessarily knowing anything about ''what'' the link conveys.
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| − | :Eve having then correlated her Alice and Bob (and possibly Carol, David, Frank... also part of the party) this might give her enough proof to pursuade Mike to help her listen in, recruit a Wendy from the network or install a Trudy of her own into the grouping. Alternately, merely by monitoring your (encrypted) home Wifi traffic, a near-neighbour prospective burglar is said to be able to identify timeslots they might be able to exploit to sneak in.
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| − | :The general counter-measure to all this might be to freely participate in a wider 'party line' throwing huge amounts of (effectively) junk-data from everwhere and to everywhere (in the Wifi example, some people suggest putting a small and irregularly but frequently active house-pet in front of a motion-triggered camera, although you could maybe just schedule a torrent-(re)seeding of something popular for 'infill' times (from a non-wired device) or maybe cron something else of your choice that's suitably intensive/weird/useful). You could even embed your communications, steganographically, deeply and sparsely within your Social Media postings (to the world) relying on your contacts reading them (and many others, including genuinely innocent interests) at their leisure. Probably then to send any replies over other completely different channels (perhaps coordinating an organised and fall-back-laden daisy-chaining of such systems to essentially form a communications loop, with TOR-style deep-embedding to safeguard point-to-point security and resiliance).
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| − | :...it all depends on how paranoid (reasonably or otherwise) you are, and how much you can mutually prep the whole setup (and ability to convey how to adopt future refinements) beforehand. [[Special:Contributions/141.101.107.142|141.101.107.142]] 18:34, 4 October 2020 (UTC)
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