Editing Talk:1844: Voting Systems
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Generally the idea behind Arrow's Theorem is that you would get different results if you did a vote where the choices were just A or B, B or C, C or A, thus no option wins head to head against the others (Condorset Paradox). An example I recently read was economic policy, and how the options being presented can cause policy to fluctuate wildly in a democracy as the outcome depends on the options compared. -- [[Special:Contributions/108.162.249.10|108.162.249.10]] 16:01, 31 May 2017 (UTC) | Generally the idea behind Arrow's Theorem is that you would get different results if you did a vote where the choices were just A or B, B or C, C or A, thus no option wins head to head against the others (Condorset Paradox). An example I recently read was economic policy, and how the options being presented can cause policy to fluctuate wildly in a democracy as the outcome depends on the options compared. -- [[Special:Contributions/108.162.249.10|108.162.249.10]] 16:01, 31 May 2017 (UTC) | ||
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:For reference: both instant run-off voting (IRV) and every concorcet method fail independence of irrelevant alternatives. Some (most?) condorcet systems satisfy all other criteria of Arrow's theorem, while IRV also fails monotonicity. Approval voting satisfies both, but it is outside the scope of Arrow's theorem as it is not a ranked voting system. [[User:Zmatt|Zmatt]] ([[User talk:Zmatt|talk]]) 18:47, 31 May 2017 (UTC) | :For reference: both instant run-off voting (IRV) and every concorcet method fail independence of irrelevant alternatives. Some (most?) condorcet systems satisfy all other criteria of Arrow's theorem, while IRV also fails monotonicity. Approval voting satisfies both, but it is outside the scope of Arrow's theorem as it is not a ranked voting system. [[User:Zmatt|Zmatt]] ([[User talk:Zmatt|talk]]) 18:47, 31 May 2017 (UTC) |