Editing Talk:2030: Voting Software
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A blockchain node doesn't technically need to be connected to the internet in order to function. It needs to have some method for receiving messages from other nodes on the blockchain network, and most blockchain nodes do indeed get these messages via the internet, but some magic beans nodes (for example) get updates about new blocks and new transactions from the Blockstream satellite. An internet connection is therefore not intrinsically necessary for a blockchain to work, it's just the most convenient way to do it. | A blockchain node doesn't technically need to be connected to the internet in order to function. It needs to have some method for receiving messages from other nodes on the blockchain network, and most blockchain nodes do indeed get these messages via the internet, but some magic beans nodes (for example) get updates about new blocks and new transactions from the Blockstream satellite. An internet connection is therefore not intrinsically necessary for a blockchain to work, it's just the most convenient way to do it. | ||
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Do you think that this comic had anything to do with the debacle in Johnson County, KS last night? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231|162.158.62.231]] 19:30, 8 August 2018 (UTC) | Do you think that this comic had anything to do with the debacle in Johnson County, KS last night? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231|162.158.62.231]] 19:30, 8 August 2018 (UTC) | ||
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:That's simple, ideally it would be a private blockchain, and the evaluators would just be every voting computer in existence (They'd all be active for a similar fairly short time period). Presumably the evaluations would be ongoing during the voting process, then could be stopped once voting was complete. The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.74.225|162.158.74.225]] | :That's simple, ideally it would be a private blockchain, and the evaluators would just be every voting computer in existence (They'd all be active for a similar fairly short time period). Presumably the evaluations would be ongoing during the voting process, then could be stopped once voting was complete. The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.74.225|162.158.74.225]] | ||
::"The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated" Thats horrifying. That alone should prove how terrible of an idea this is. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.181|162.158.154.181]] 17:14, 9 August 2018 (UTC) | ::"The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated" Thats horrifying. That alone should prove how terrible of an idea this is. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.181|162.158.154.181]] 17:14, 9 August 2018 (UTC) | ||
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Wouldn't it be possible to run said blockchain on one's personal computer, instead of running on a voting machine? and you could compile open source software yourself to perform the voting. That sounds like a solid enough way to keep security fine to me, but if I'm missing something, please tell me. [[User:Gjgfuj|TheSandromatic]] ([[User talk:Gjgfuj|talk]]) 03:25, 9 August 2018 (UTC) | Wouldn't it be possible to run said blockchain on one's personal computer, instead of running on a voting machine? and you could compile open source software yourself to perform the voting. That sounds like a solid enough way to keep security fine to me, but if I'm missing something, please tell me. [[User:Gjgfuj|TheSandromatic]] ([[User talk:Gjgfuj|talk]]) 03:25, 9 August 2018 (UTC) | ||
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Carrying the SD cards to the central computer would still take time, but we're carrying much smaller things so it might speed up somewhat (less stuff to haul around), and the voting can be done nearly as fast as the central computer can read in the SD cards. | Carrying the SD cards to the central computer would still take time, but we're carrying much smaller things so it might speed up somewhat (less stuff to haul around), and the voting can be done nearly as fast as the central computer can read in the SD cards. | ||
No strange SD cards go into the central machine since they're carried by the same trustworthy human that counts the paper votes. | No strange SD cards go into the central machine since they're carried by the same trustworthy human that counts the paper votes. | ||
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What things will go wrong? Zillions, I'm sure. But what zillions? I'm curious! | What things will go wrong? Zillions, I'm sure. But what zillions? I'm curious! | ||
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You could all reference Brazil for how an electronic voting system works. It changed in the late 90s after a major country-wide voting fraud scandal that revealed that most of the vote counters in the whole country were unreliable, partisan, bribed or all three; to the point any recount would bring a vastly different result. The Brazilian public lost all faith in the paper ballots and the Federal Electoral Tribunal had to implement an electronic voting system to reacquire voter trust in the voting system. | You could all reference Brazil for how an electronic voting system works. It changed in the late 90s after a major country-wide voting fraud scandal that revealed that most of the vote counters in the whole country were unreliable, partisan, bribed or all three; to the point any recount would bring a vastly different result. The Brazilian public lost all faith in the paper ballots and the Federal Electoral Tribunal had to implement an electronic voting system to reacquire voter trust in the voting system. | ||
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Twenty years later the public in general still trust the system more than the paper ballot but the losing side in presidential elections always cry afoul about the machines being tampered with (Even though the political parties that complained about fraud for losing the presidential election ended up winning the majority of the seats in both congress and senate, as well as state governships. But, you see, for those elections the system is foolproof, even though they're all done at the same time in the same voting machines.) | Twenty years later the public in general still trust the system more than the paper ballot but the losing side in presidential elections always cry afoul about the machines being tampered with (Even though the political parties that complained about fraud for losing the presidential election ended up winning the majority of the seats in both congress and senate, as well as state governships. But, you see, for those elections the system is foolproof, even though they're all done at the same time in the same voting machines.) | ||
: Please sign your comments. The issue is a reduction of points of failure. In a paper ballot system, you have tens of thousands of humans being observed by each other and representatives of interested parties and judges doing the counting. A single malicious person would have to go to incredible effort to hide their miscountings, and then would only be able to change a hundred votes or so. In an electronic voting system, all it takes is one person to do an SD card swap and boom: tens of thousands of votes are changed. One person can change the code on the central counting system that reads the SD cards, and boom: millions of votes are changed. The fact that so much effort would be needed to change the result in a paper ballot system is a security feature. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231|162.158.62.231]] 12:00, 11 August 2018 (UTC) | : Please sign your comments. The issue is a reduction of points of failure. In a paper ballot system, you have tens of thousands of humans being observed by each other and representatives of interested parties and judges doing the counting. A single malicious person would have to go to incredible effort to hide their miscountings, and then would only be able to change a hundred votes or so. In an electronic voting system, all it takes is one person to do an SD card swap and boom: tens of thousands of votes are changed. One person can change the code on the central counting system that reads the SD cards, and boom: millions of votes are changed. The fact that so much effort would be needed to change the result in a paper ballot system is a security feature. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231|162.158.62.231]] 12:00, 11 August 2018 (UTC) | ||
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