Difference between revisions of "Talk:2899: Goodhart's Law"
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I don't think there's anything else that could be included in the transcript, so i'm deleting the incomplete tag. if anyone has an idea to make it better, just add it. i know it seems too soon, but there's really nothing else to the comic. [[User:New editor|New editor]] ([[User talk:New editor|talk]]) 22:17, 26 February 2024 (UTC) | I don't think there's anything else that could be included in the transcript, so i'm deleting the incomplete tag. if anyone has an idea to make it better, just add it. i know it seems too soon, but there's really nothing else to the comic. [[User:New editor|New editor]] ([[User talk:New editor|talk]]) 22:17, 26 February 2024 (UTC) | ||
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| + | This happens all the time. For instance, a call center whose metric-turned-target is number of calls handled per hour (which sounds good in theory) is incentivised to hang up on callers, who then call back - increasing their "performance" as measured by the target, as it both decreases the time each call takes (thus making time for more calls) and increases the volume of incoming calls. Of course, the side effect is ticked-off customers heading to competitors instead. (Which often doesn't affect the call center as it's a third party.) If the metric-turned-target is getting a good survey response at the end of the call, treating the customer so badly they hang up (and thus don't take the survey) for any call that is going poorly becomes a viable way of improving the measurement of their performance. Creating good targets is HARD. [[Special:Contributions/172.70.43.157|172.70.43.157]] 22:38, 26 February 2024 (UTC) | ||
Revision as of 22:38, 26 February 2024
I don't think there's anything else that could be included in the transcript, so i'm deleting the incomplete tag. if anyone has an idea to make it better, just add it. i know it seems too soon, but there's really nothing else to the comic. New editor (talk) 22:17, 26 February 2024 (UTC)
This happens all the time. For instance, a call center whose metric-turned-target is number of calls handled per hour (which sounds good in theory) is incentivised to hang up on callers, who then call back - increasing their "performance" as measured by the target, as it both decreases the time each call takes (thus making time for more calls) and increases the volume of incoming calls. Of course, the side effect is ticked-off customers heading to competitors instead. (Which often doesn't affect the call center as it's a third party.) If the metric-turned-target is getting a good survey response at the end of the call, treating the customer so badly they hang up (and thus don't take the survey) for any call that is going poorly becomes a viable way of improving the measurement of their performance. Creating good targets is HARD. 172.70.43.157 22:38, 26 February 2024 (UTC)
