1505: Ontological Argument
| Ontological Argument |
 Title text: A God who holds the world record for eating the most skateboards is greater than a God who does not hold that record. |
Explanation
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This explanation may be incomplete or incorrect: First draft. Could use some attention from someone better-versed in theology and/or philosophy. If you can address this issue, please edit the page! Thanks. |
The ontological argument has never been formally disproven, and Bertrand Russell noted that "it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies." This comic proposes a potential fallacy. Suppose that the ontological argument proved that there was a greatest entity, and that entity was God. If this God could disprove the validity of the ontological argument, then there is no longer a valid proof that this entity is God. Therefore, this God that is proved by the ontological argument must not be able to disprove the ontological argument. This comic jokingly suggests that if there was an entity that could disprove the ontological argument, then the entity is "greater" since this entity can do something that the other entity cannot. Now, the original entity can no longer be proved as God by the ontological argument, since there is a greater entity. The ontological argument cannot be a valid proof that the new entity is God either, since this entity can disprove it. If the suggestion was taken at face value, then the result is that the ontological argument cannot prove the existence of God. However, it is absurd that an entity (which exists) can disprove its own existence. Hence, the proposed fallacy cannot disprove the ontological argument.
Along with the title text, this comic also pokes fun at the ambiguous notion of "greatness" used in the ontological argument, pointing out that there must be some restrictions on what constitutes "greatness" in order for the ontological argument to prove the existence of God. This is not an unfamiliar critique to actual proponents of the ontological argument; their response is indeed to give a more precise meaning of "greatness". For example, using it to refer to "goodness" in a moral sense, rather than the trivial sense of "most extreme" as used in the comic.
The format of this argument is similar in character to the kinds of contradictions exploited in Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the Halting problem, and those ideas are related to Russell's paradox. The paradox of "greatness" itself is somewhat similar to the question of "What happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object?"
The above explanation only work if God is bound to rules of our logic. If there was a valid ontological argument and therefore a God entity, it might be able to find a flaw in a proven logic argument, because it is not bound to the rules of logic (or at least our limited understanding of them). -- (not sure how to integrate this idea in the above text)
The title text refers to an extreme example that a god that can do something better than another god cannot do is always greater.
Transcript
- [Megan and Cueball are walking side-by-side]
- Megan: ...But wouldn't a God who could find a flaw in the ontological argument be even greater?
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Reminds me some kind of the Babel Fish... Elektrizikekswerk (talk) 06:54, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Isn't the greatest fallacy of ontological argument the fact that the set of entities may not be well-ordered by "greatest" or "goodness"? -- Hkmaly (talk) 11:17, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Step 1: Take S to be the set of such entities. Step 2: When I reach step 3, if S hasn't managed to find a well-ordering relation for itself....
- I can't think of what to say next.. 108.162.221.242 22:59, 31 March 2015 (UTC)BK201
- That's a great point, and (IMHO) a truly serious problem in these attempts to "order" gods (maybe it stems from being tied down to monotheistic thinking?). But it's not really a "fallacy," properly speaking. Not all flaws in reasoning are fallacies... 108.162.210.39 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
- I think that (using this argument) the first flaw arises when defining the "set of entities". How can we define it and make sure that it is indeed a set? 141.101.98.245 14:56, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- I think the greatest fallacy is that they start with the conclusion that the fantasy that God exists isn't a fantasy, and then try to "reason" their way into finding support for that conclusion. IOW, claiming to apply reason while working in exactly the opposite way that true reasoning demands. I realize ontological arguments, as the explanation currently says, "seek to prove that God exists using only premises about the nature of existence and logical deductions from them. This is in contrast to arguments that are based on observations of the world". But you don't get to reject the logical scientific method (marshal the facts and THEN draw conclusions from them) and then claim you're being logical. - Equinox 199.27.128.120 15:15, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- I'm not sure that checks out. While it's true that they are looking for proof of their belief rather than forming a belief, it's more like an experiment where you are looking for the cause of something you know about, at least from their perspective. It's a philosophical argument/thought experiment about religion, so they get away with some things that don't fly in science. No, the biggest flaw is the assumption that since we can conceive of it, it must exist. just because we can conceive of a perfect being, and it would be even greater if it existed, does not inherently mean it does. I can conceive of a world in which I do not exist, but that doesn't mean we are in that world, nor that such a world exists (ignoring anything to do with a multiverse). It's tautological at best, like saying, this thing would be true if it was true. it can also be thought of as "in order for a being to be perfect, it must exist, so such a being must exist so that it can be perfect," which is a little easier to wrap your head around. I'm not saying there is no god, to be clear, I'm just saying that the ontological argument is not acceptable proof of that god's existence. Stardragon (talk) 23:50, 6 April 2022 (UTC)
- I find some humor in that 'A god who could find a flaw in the ontological argument' could easily be accomplished by a being who met and/or exceeded the original premise of being 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Some of the more obvious logical flaws are pointed out in this thread, and proving the thought process wrong doesn't really affect its overall truthiness in either direction. 108.162.221.133 07:22, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
Yay a potential large, all-encompassing argument about religion waiting to happen. Oh glory day. The Goyim speaks (talk) 13:37, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
Any chance this is really about an omnipotence paradox? Can god create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? Is he so powerful that he can find a flaw in any argument that proves he exists? 108.162.237.186 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
Why is the William Lane Craig section in there? If there are dozens of versions of the ontological argument on wikipedia, it makes sense to list the original (Anselm), the most famous critique of it (Dawkins), and then refer the reader to wikipedia for more information. The Craig variant is not explained here and seems cherry-picked out of the long list on wikipedia for no clear reason. Djbrasier (talk) 14:08, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- The text I replaced claimed that ontological arguments for the existence of God are based on the idea that a God that exists is greater than a God that does not exist. I changed it to say that Anselm's version says that and there are other ontological arguments that don't say that. I used William Lane Craig as the clearest and easiest to understand example from the Wikipedia article for which that is not the case. That said, I like how people have edited it since better than what I wrote. Bugstomper (talk) 00:35, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
Super ultra chocolate fudge cookies mega sundae (from here on refered to as "happy happy") is by definition the best ice cream imaginable, meaning we can't concieve of a better ice cream. but, if the happy happy exists solely in your mind as an idea, than surely you can concieve of a better happy happy, that is, the one that is sitting on a desk in front of you. Therefore, the happy happy must be the one that exists right in front of you. now, where's my ice cream?? 141.101.98.244 16:57, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Someone should put a happy happy on 141.101.98.244's desk when he isn't looking.199.27.128.185 00:27, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
"Ontological arguments, in general, are arguments that attempt to prove a point by involving a "higher reason" or purpose for the point. " These are teleological arguments, not ontological. -- Atnorman (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
I noticed by pure coincidence that Megan and Cueball are posed exactly as they were in 1315: Questions for God. Is that the only time they were posed like that while posing a theological question, or is this a broader pattern? I haven't found any others, offhand. Also noticed that the Ontological argument came up very subtly in 1052: Every Major's Terrible. Jachra (talk) 21:31, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- 1052: Every Major's Terrible does not reference the ontological argument. X therefore X exists is not the argument. -- Atnorman (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
Yeah but that's a strawman fallacy. I win. I commit no fallacy, except the fallacy fallacy. The Goyim speaks (talk) 17:06, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
- Errm, isn't "Goyim" a plural and therefore wouldn't "speaks" but "speak"? -- Gearoid (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
There are some ontological arguments that actually work, though. Like Rule 34. Well, in most cases at least; I'm pretty sure there are some examples that fail the rule, but I don't want to check. --198.41.243.5 07:34, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
Is a philosopher who assembles words into ("concieves") statements or questions that are inherently meaningless but appear meaningful greater than one who makes only meaningful ones? 173.245.53.81 07:54, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
- Mu. 172.68.11.53 15:53, 7 March 2017 (UTC)
Is it worth mentioning that an omnipresent God would, by definition, have eaten EVERY skateboard that was ever eaten, and even if that number is zero, would therefore be at worst tied for the world record?
