1505: Ontological Argument
| Ontological Argument |
 Title text: A God who holds the world record for eating the most skateboards is greater than a God who does not hold that record. |
Explanation
Ontology is the study of being, reality, and existence. “The ontological argument” is an attempt at proving the existence of God through reasoning about the nature of “being”.
Megan's statement in the comic is likely a reference to what is considered the first ontological argument, that of 11th Century philosopher Anselm of Canterbury. His argument starts by defining God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”. Another step in the argument is that you can conceive of such a being even if you don't believe it exists. Yet another step is the statement that a being, of which one can conceive, and which exists, is certainly greater than a being of which one can conceive and which does not exist. Implicit in the argument are two essential premises, both of which are controversial. These are a) that the existence of such a being is possible, and b) that existence is a great-making quality.
The comic makes fun of Anselm's ontological argument by extending to absurdity the claim that a being who exists is greater than one who does not exist, and that therefore God must exist. A God who can disprove the ontological argument must be greater than one who cannot disprove the ontological argument, therefore the ontological argument proves the existence of a God that disproves it. This argument, though a joke, carries some weight. If Anselm's argument is sound, then disproving it is impossible, and God cannot do it. But if doing things is a great-making quality (a common assumption), then surely doing impossible things would be an even stronger great-making quality. Therefore the argument is able to be disproven, albeit only by God, which contradicts the initial premise that the argument is sound. Therefore, either doing things is not great-making, or the entire ontological argument is invalid reasoning.
The title text carries the absurdity a step further.
The comic also may be drawing an analogy to the omnipotence paradox, as it also refers to the idea that God's power would be greater if He could do the logically impossible. If Randall believes that Anselm's ontological argument is logically sound and based on true premises, then he should think it is impossible to disprove. Therefore, he references the omnipotence paradox by requiring that God do such an impossible thing in order to have maximally great power.
A popular parody of the ontological argument is that of Richard Dawkins, in his best-selling book “The God Delusion”. His parody is a version of the argument which attempts to prove that God does not exist. It is similar in approach to this comic and to the omnipotence paradox, in that it also requires a God that can do the logically impossible. In Dawkins' version—borrowed from the Australian philosopher Douglas Gasking—God's greatness is demonstrated by his creation of the world. A being that somehow overcomes the great handicap of not existing and goes on to create the world would certainly be greater than a being that exists and creates the world. Therefore God, who by definition is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”, must not exist.
Another, rather more famous parody, but which is entirely unrelated to the comic in approach, is that of Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, in which he argues for the existence of a maximally great island. This parody, added to the comic, seems to tell us what happened to the legendary Atlantis. It is worth noting that Anselm himself rebutted Gaunilo's argument, claiming that it was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Anselm's original argument.
Not all ontological arguments for the existence of God rely on the notion that a God that exists is greater than one that does not exist. Examples include the modal ontological argument from Alvin Plantinga, and Gödel's ontological proof. Graham Oppy, an authority on ontological arguments, attempts to classify here what exactly makes arguments ontological; he concludes that it is that they are a priori in nature. He also classifies them into eight categories: definitional, conceptual, modal, Meinongian, experiential, mereological, higher order, and Hegelian.
This comic, in particular in the way Megan and Cueball are walking and in its reference to theology, greatly resembles the earlier comic 1315: Questions for God.
Transcript
- [Megan and Cueball are walking side-by-side.]
- Megan: ...but wouldn't a God who could find a flaw in the ontological argument be even greater?
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Reminds me some kind of the Babel Fish... Elektrizikekswerk (talk) 06:54, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Isn't the greatest fallacy of ontological argument the fact that the set of entities may not be well-ordered by "greatest" or "goodness"? -- Hkmaly (talk) 11:17, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Step 1: Take S to be the set of such entities. Step 2: When I reach step 3, if S hasn't managed to find a well-ordering relation for itself....
- I can't think of what to say next.. 108.162.221.242 22:59, 31 March 2015 (UTC)BK201
- That's a great point, and (IMHO) a truly serious problem in these attempts to "order" gods (maybe it stems from being tied down to monotheistic thinking?). But it's not really a "fallacy," properly speaking. Not all flaws in reasoning are fallacies... 108.162.210.39 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
- I think that (using this argument) the first flaw arises when defining the "set of entities". How can we define it and make sure that it is indeed a set? 141.101.98.245 14:56, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- I think the greatest fallacy is that they start with the conclusion that the fantasy that God exists isn't a fantasy, and then try to "reason" their way into finding support for that conclusion. IOW, claiming to apply reason while working in exactly the opposite way that true reasoning demands. I realize ontological arguments, as the explanation currently says, "seek to prove that God exists using only premises about the nature of existence and logical deductions from them. This is in contrast to arguments that are based on observations of the world". But you don't get to reject the logical scientific method (marshal the facts and THEN draw conclusions from them) and then claim you're being logical. - Equinox 199.27.128.120 15:15, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- I'm not sure that checks out. While it's true that they are looking for proof of their belief rather than forming a belief, it's more like an experiment where you are looking for the cause of something you know about, at least from their perspective. It's a philosophical argument/thought experiment about religion, so they get away with some things that don't fly in science. No, the biggest flaw is the assumption that since we can conceive of it, it must exist. just because we can conceive of a perfect being, and it would be even greater if it existed, does not inherently mean it does. I can conceive of a world in which I do not exist, but that doesn't mean we are in that world, nor that such a world exists (ignoring anything to do with a multiverse). It's tautological at best, like saying, this thing would be true if it was true. it can also be thought of as "in order for a being to be perfect, it must exist, so such a being must exist so that it can be perfect," which is a little easier to wrap your head around. I'm not saying there is no god, to be clear, I'm just saying that the ontological argument is not acceptable proof of that god's existence. Stardragon (talk) 23:50, 6 April 2022 (UTC)
- I find some humor in that 'A god who could find a flaw in the ontological argument' could easily be accomplished by a being who met and/or exceeded the original premise of being 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Some of the more obvious logical flaws are pointed out in this thread, and proving the thought process wrong doesn't really affect its overall truthiness in either direction. 108.162.221.133 07:22, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
Yay a potential large, all-encompassing argument about religion waiting to happen. Oh glory day. The Goyim speaks (talk) 13:37, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
Any chance this is really about an omnipotence paradox? Can god create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? Is he so powerful that he can find a flaw in any argument that proves he exists? 108.162.237.186 (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
Why is the William Lane Craig section in there? If there are dozens of versions of the ontological argument on wikipedia, it makes sense to list the original (Anselm), the most famous critique of it (Dawkins), and then refer the reader to wikipedia for more information. The Craig variant is not explained here and seems cherry-picked out of the long list on wikipedia for no clear reason. Djbrasier (talk) 14:08, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- The text I replaced claimed that ontological arguments for the existence of God are based on the idea that a God that exists is greater than a God that does not exist. I changed it to say that Anselm's version says that and there are other ontological arguments that don't say that. I used William Lane Craig as the clearest and easiest to understand example from the Wikipedia article for which that is not the case. That said, I like how people have edited it since better than what I wrote. Bugstomper (talk) 00:35, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
Super ultra chocolate fudge cookies mega sundae (from here on refered to as "happy happy") is by definition the best ice cream imaginable, meaning we can't concieve of a better ice cream. but, if the happy happy exists solely in your mind as an idea, than surely you can concieve of a better happy happy, that is, the one that is sitting on a desk in front of you. Therefore, the happy happy must be the one that exists right in front of you. now, where's my ice cream?? 141.101.98.244 16:57, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Someone should put a happy happy on 141.101.98.244's desk when he isn't looking.199.27.128.185 00:27, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
"Ontological arguments, in general, are arguments that attempt to prove a point by involving a "higher reason" or purpose for the point. " These are teleological arguments, not ontological. -- Atnorman (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
I noticed by pure coincidence that Megan and Cueball are posed exactly as they were in 1315: Questions for God. Is that the only time they were posed like that while posing a theological question, or is this a broader pattern? I haven't found any others, offhand. Also noticed that the Ontological argument came up very subtly in 1052: Every Major's Terrible. Jachra (talk) 21:31, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- 1052: Every Major's Terrible does not reference the ontological argument. X therefore X exists is not the argument. -- Atnorman (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
Yeah but that's a strawman fallacy. I win. I commit no fallacy, except the fallacy fallacy. The Goyim speaks (talk) 17:06, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
- Errm, isn't "Goyim" a plural and therefore wouldn't "speaks" but "speak"? -- Gearoid (talk) (please sign your comments with ~~~~)
There are some ontological arguments that actually work, though. Like Rule 34. Well, in most cases at least; I'm pretty sure there are some examples that fail the rule, but I don't want to check. --198.41.243.5 07:34, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
Is a philosopher who assembles words into ("concieves") statements or questions that are inherently meaningless but appear meaningful greater than one who makes only meaningful ones? 173.245.53.81 07:54, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
- Mu. 172.68.11.53 15:53, 7 March 2017 (UTC)
Is it worth mentioning that an omnipresent God would, by definition, have eaten EVERY skateboard that was ever eaten, and even if that number is zero, would therefore be at worst tied for the world record?
"Beings what can be conceived" are subset of greater category - "All things, including those what humans can't conceive". Therefore, let's say what God is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived". Then, let's say we have The Great Unconceivable One, "that than which nothing greater can or could exist, regardless of whether it's conceivable". Basically, The Great Unconceivable One is eldrich being of such power, what only God himself can merely conceive The Great Unconceivable One, and what even God can't match the The Great Unconceivable One in power. That would make The Great Unconceivable One greater than God. And then, we would have infinite recursion - next in line is The Greater Unconceivable One, what only The Great Unconceivable One can conceive - then even more eldrich and powerful things. At the "top" of said infinite line of increasingly powerful beings would be The Greatest Unconceivable One, the greatest of them all. --172.69.222.164 07:47, 24 November 2024 (UTC)
- (I have no problem with your argument, generally, but the multiple use of severl "what"s, instead of "that"s, might be something that you want to resist doing that. Fitting in with your local dialect or idiolect is fine, whether you be William Brown or from the various council estates of East London, but learn Code-switching and represent yourself (and your philosophy) better. Just a friendly tip. You might already know this, of course, but on the off-chance that you're not deliberately adopting a patois feel...) 162.158.33.253 12:54, 24 November 2024 (UTC)
- Shorter version: God is "(t/w)hat than which nothing greater can be conceived". "Things what can be conceived" ("Conceivable") are subset of bigger group, "All things, including those what can't be conceived". The Great Unconceivable One is "(t/w)hat than which nothing greater can or could exist, regardless of whether it's conceivable". Since "conceivable" group is subset of (smaller than and included in) "everything including non-conceivable", The Great Unconceivable One is greater than God. --172.69.68.70 11:22, 29 November 2024 (UTC)
- "things which can be conceived", "those which can't be conceived" 172.71.130.142 12:43, 29 November 2024 (UTC)
